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Casenote
INSERT COINS TO SLAY!
REGULATING CHILDREN'S ACCESS
TO VIOLENT ARCADE GAMES
I. INTRODUCTION
To complete the abysmal mission of the video game Doom, a
player deposits a trail of disfigured corpses while single-handedly
devising a mass bloodbath.1 Ravenous demons compel the player
to slay and dismember each living obstacle on the screen to achieve
savage victory.2 Reward for consummate carnage includes compli-
mentary ammunition, allowing the player to load up and shower
more bullets into "undead" flesh.3
In the video game Quake II, after one shot to the player's oppo-
nent, the player must refrain from celebrating for fear that the vic-
tim may still be alive. 4 To relieve this apprehension, the player
instinctively executes a prolonged blast at the victim's corpse until
flies hover around the blood-soaked, decapitated cadaver.5 The
player learns to plant explosives skillfully, lob grenades, and "use
1. See Old School Doom - General Information, at http://www.doomcenter.com/
oldschool/generalinfo.phtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) ('You're a space marine
armed with a mere pistol. Your mission is to locate more substantial firepower,
blow your way through an onslaught of undead marines and mutant demons from
hell, and navigate yourself off a radioactive moon base.").
2. See id. ("In order to survive, not only do you have to make it through the
first 27 blood-splattered levels of Doom, you also have to get through nine more
incredibly tough expert levels in the all-new episode 'Thy Flesh Consumed.'").
3. See id. (using video game jargon to label enemy, "undead marines"). Play-
ers covet "cheats" or hidden codes that provide full armor and weapons, "God
mode," which triggers invincibility, the ability to walk through walls, teleportation,
and more. See Old School Doom - Cheats, at http://www.doomcenter.com/old-
school/cheats.phtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
4. See The Quake II Bootcamp: Tactics: Fundamentals, Conserve Ammo, at http://
www.planetquake.com/bootcamp/tactics/fundamental.shtm (Mar. 9, 1998) (ad-
vising players to conserve ammunition by "control[ling] your impulse [to] shoot
anything you see until it dies" and to "[o] nly shoot when you are sure it has at least
a 75% chance of doing some damage").
5. SeeJamesJ. Holland, Game Review: Quake II, at http://webarchive.org/web/
20010622071509/www.pcgameworld.com/reviews/q/quake2/index.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2002) (depicting game's gory graphics). Players of the game are in-
structed as follows: "Shoot [the enemy] and watch the blood spots appear on [his]
bod[y]. Decapitate [him] with a few well placed shots and watch the flies swarm
around the rotting corpse. It's the attention to details like this that makes Quake
II so enjoyable." Id.
(69)
1
Previte: Insert Coins to Slay - Regulating Children's Access to Violent Ar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
70 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
any automatic weapon to rip [the opponent] in half. '6 When the
player becomes more adept, he or she can execute murder and mu-
tilation with ease. 7
In Mortal Kombat, one of the most skilled moves a player mas-
ters, if he or she is so auspicious, is called a "fatality." A player
performs this elite maneuver of complex button-pushing once
prompted by a chilling voice that mercilessly bellows, "FINISH
HIM," and then induces his or her character to reach a bare hand
into the opponent's chest, rip out the still-beating heart, and heave
it onto the ground as blood spews all over the screen. 9
Released in 2001, Grand Theft Auto III is a recent addition to
the world of violent video games. 10 In this game, a player slays an
6. The Quake II Bootcamp: Tactics: Advanced, Pattern of Fire, at http://www.planet
quake.com/bootcamp/tactics/advanced.shtm (Jan. 26, 1998) (instructing players
on how to define pattern of fire). Players are advised:
When you get within point blank range of a victim, use any automatic
weapon to rip them [sic] in half. Start at the feet, and work your way to
the [victim's upper left]. If your opponent attempts to run away, you are
already tracking them [sic] . . . so it is much easier to kill them [sic].
Id.
7. See The Quake II Bootcamp: Tactics: Advanced, Overestimate Your Foes, at http://
www.planetquake.com/bootcamp/tactics/advanced.shtm (Feb. 17, 1998) (warn-
ing players that once they "become very skilled at Quake II, [they] begin to find
that the average Quaker is very unchallenging to kill" and should therefore overes-
timate every opponent "so [they] will not lose [their] skills").
8. See Mortal Kombat Series, Synopsis, at http://www.yesterdayland.com/po-
popedia/shows/arcade/ag1089.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) ("Mortal Kombat
was one of the bloodiest, goriest, most gruesomely violent games to hit the market
[in 1992]. It was also one of the most popular .... ").
9. See id. ("With a series of button and joystick moves, your kombatant [fin-
ishes him] - punching the foe's head off his body, ripping out his spine, causing
his head to explode, ripping out his heart, charring his body, etc."); see also Stuart
Clarke, Guts and Glory, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 17, 1998, at 18 (noting
newer version of game, MK4, allows player to "chop [an opponent] into pieces
[and] . . . contains weapons as well as hand-to-hand fighting, with each character
able to pull out a blade of choice (mace, spiked club, sword, cross bow, boome-
rang, etc [sic]) at any time throughout the bout").
10. See Douglass C. Perry, The Cinematic Touch of Grand Theft Auto III, at http:/
/ps2.ign.com/articles/098/098930p1.html (Oct. 9, 2001) (interviewing game pub-
lisher's lead analyst, Adam Davidson, who described game's integration of "cut-
scenes"). The premise of the game is as follows:
Grand Theft Auto III tells the story of a love-tarnished bank robber-punk
whose girlfriend has shot him, stolen his goods, almost lands him in the
slammer, and who is now on the loose with a rival urban warlord. As the
anonymous ground-level criminal seeking payback and a strange kind of
truth, your job is to find out what happened, who's in control, and how
you can do something about it. By performing numerous tasks, learning
everything there is to know about Liberty City, and by making your way
up through the ranks of the Mafia, you learn these things, and much,
much more.
[Vol. 10: p. 69
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unsuspecting driver-if especially lucky, an ambulance driver or po-
lice officer-and then pilfers the vehicle, has sex with a prostitute
to restore health diminished by bullet wounds, and garners fortune
by pocketing the prostitute's cash after pummeling her, pushing
her out of the vehicle, and driving over her body.1 Myriad acts of
violence and vandalism are at a player's fingertips throughout a
wild ride of looting and killing. 12
Even more recently in 2002, Hitman 2 was released, empower-
ing the player to take on the persona of "Agent 47," a hired assassin
sought out by organized criminals for his killing prowess.13 The
player starts in Sicily and then travels to Japan, Russia, Malaysia, and
India, accomplishing killing missions and acquiring an arsenal of
weapons, including a knife, magnums, silenced handguns, colts, a
sniper rifle, shotguns, submachine guns, ninja swords, axes, fiber
wire, and crossbows. 14 The player is ranked based on number of
assassinations and style of killing, and assigned a title, such as
Wimp, Thug, Hatchet Man, Slayer, Butcher, Mass Murderer, and
the coveted Silent Assassin.' 5
11. See Tips and Tricks, at http://homel.swipnet.se/-w-13110/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author) (providing tips for avid players). Players are
advised:
[I]f you run over a person you get $100 ... but if you take a[n] ambu-
lance or a firetruck, you get $200 .... When you steal a person[']s car, if
you run the driver over you get $700 .... If you use a flamethrower to
kill the cops you get lots of points .... In fact, use the flamethrower to
kill everyone. It[']s fun to watch people die and you get bunches of
points.
Id.
12. See Chip & Jonathan Carter, Inside the Video Games, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
24, 2001, at G12. The game is played as follows: "You roam big-city streets looking
for vehicles to jack and havoc to wreak. Need some cash? Rob a passerby. Wanna
really secure your spot in hell? Wait for the ambulance to arrive at the scene, then
bust up the driver and jack his ride." Id.
13. See Hitman 2: Silent Assassin, at http://www.pcgameworld.com/game.php/
id/1228 (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) ("Enter the realm of a retired assassin, forced
back into action by treason. You [are] a hired killer ... [v]isit[ing] the dark re-
cesses of a world corrupted by crime, greed, degradation and dishonour [sic].)".
14. See Douglass C. Perry, Hitman 2: Silent Assassin, at http://ps2.ign.com/arti-
cles/372/372904pl.html (Oct. 2, 2002) ("Hitman 2 takes players into the world of
high-level government conspiracies, diplomatic imbroglios and millionaire busi-
nessmen with a penchant for illegal activities .... [T]he weapon cache is healthy
and satisfying, giving gamers the happy tools of the assassin trade .... ).
15. See HitMan2 Rankings, at http://www.hitmanforum.com/forum/view-
thread.php?tid=65 (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (posting players' input regarding
rankings). To achieve Thug status, one player commented, "[I] killed only two,
but barg[ed] past hordes of enemies .... Id. To be coined Slayer, the player
committed five to seven assassinations, and for Hatchet Man, he committed eight.
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Ultimately, Hitman 2's concept and gory graphics shocked
cable television stations, including adult networks such as MTV,
Comedy Central, Sci-Fi, and USA, inducing them to ban broadcast
of the game's original advertisement.' 6 Nevertheless, this game and
the others described above represent the most popular video games
of today's youth, demonstrating a gigantic leap from Pac-Man, Frog-
ger, Donkey Kong, and Q*bert, where the tasks were as innocuous as
eating yellow dots, crossing busy streets, climbing ladders, and
changing the colors of cubes.' 7
Psychologists believe violent video games contribute to juvenile
violence by exposing impressionable minds to dangerous behaviors
without the real-life consequences.18 Their research shows that
these video games are detrimental to children for four reasons.1 9
16. See New, Mostly Non-Banned Hitman 2 Commercial, at http://ps2.ign.com/
articles/374/374186pl.html (Oct. 11, 2002) (noting approval of all but one net-
work to broadcast new, less graphic version of original commercial).
17. See Arcade Games, at http://www.yesterdayland.com/popopedia/shows/
categories/arcade/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (noting evolution of video games
from 1980s to 1990s and present); see also Donkey Kong, Synopsis, at http://
www.yesterdayland.com/popopedia/shows/arcade/agl041.php (last visited Oct.
12, 2002) (describing Donkey Kong, released in 1981, in which carpenter "moved up
through levels of steel girders to reach Donkey Kong and [kidnapped girlfriend]
Pauline at the top .... Once all the supports were gone, Donkey Kong fell straight
down on his ape noggin, and the happy human couple was reunited."); Frogger,
Synposis, at http://www.yesterdayland.com/popopedia/shows/arcade/ag1051.php
(last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (stating objective of Frogger, released in 1981, "was al-
most Zen-like: to get to the other side .... Using the joystick to hop up, down, left
and right, you guided your frog pal up and around [zooming cars, trucks, buses,
snakes, alligators and unpredictable turtles] to the relative safety of a dirt me-
dian."); Pac-Man Series, Synopsis, at http://www.yesterdayland.com/popopedia/
shows/arcade/ag100.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (describing Pac-Man, re-
leased in 1980, as "the most successful arcade game in history, [where a] little
yellow orb with [an] enormous mouth ... [ate] little power pellets, dots of energy
that lined the corridors of a bright blue maze [while dodging] [f]our pastel-
colored ghosts... "); Q*bert, Synposis, at http://www.yesterdayland.com/po-
popedia/shows/arcade/agl 1I 1.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) ("Q's purpose in
life was to hop around the tops of ... cubes, changing every square to a specific
color (i.e. - from blue to yellow) .... [In] later rounds, cubes had to be touched
twice, cubes changed back to the wrong color if they got hopped on again, etc.").
18. See Tara C. Campbell, Comment, Did Video Games Train the School Shooters to
Kill? Determining Whether Wisconsin Courts Should Impose Negligence or Strict Liability in
a Lawsuit Against the Video Game Manufacturers, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 811, 818 (2001)
(explaining psychologists' theories that violent video games contribute to juvenile
violence as seen in high school massacres); see alsoJoe Holleman, Violent Videos Take
Some Hits, Sr. Louis POsT-DISPATCii, Aug. 27, 2000, at EVI (linking violent video
games to Columbine High School incident, where teenaged murderers were vio-
lent video game enthusiasts).
19. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 818-22 (labeling four harms as (1) operant
conditioning, (2) stimulus addiction, (3) problem solving approaches, and (4) de-
sensitization); see also Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3 (explaining results of stud-
ies by psychologists Karen E. Dill and Craig A. Anderson on "effects of video-game
[Vol. 10: p. 69
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First, they teach children that they must kill or inflict violence to
receive points and ultimately win. 20 Such conditioning trains chil-
dren to equate violence with rewards. 21 Second, experts believe vio-
lent video games create stimulus addiction. 22 Each time a child
plays, he or she craves increased violence. 23 A child must experi-
ence more violence to attain the same emotional high because the
violence already realized becomes familiar, and thus less stimulat-
ing.24 Third, psychologists believe violent video games teach chil-
dren unhealthy problem-solving techniques. 25 Psychologists are
concerned that the games teach children that violence achieves
goals and resolves all conflicts in life. 26 Finally, psychologists fear
violent video games desensitize children to killing, death, and vio-
playing on people's aggressive tendencies, as well as the effect on overall intelli-
gence," in differentiating from those effects caused by mere television).
20. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 818-19 ("[W]hen playing a video game, a
player kills someone and is rewarded by receiving points and advancing to higher
levels."); Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3 (equating video games with gambling
because of system of rewards, except that with video games, "it is aggressive behav-
ior (kill[ing], for example) that gets you . . .rewards").
21. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 818-19 (explaining as result of operant
conditioning, "the video game player essentially becomes trained to ... caus[e]
harm to others"); Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3 (noting player becomes partici-
pant rather than spectator by choosing character, determining strategy, and exe-
cuting it to earn reward).
22. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 819-20 (describing emotional response
from playing video games that is absent when simply watching television); see also
Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3 (noting video game playing induces brain to se-
crete addictive pleasure chemical called dopamine, usually associated with sexual
activity or drug use).
23. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 819 (noting cravings can be satisfied by
more violence and higher levels in video games).
24. See id. at 819-20 (theorizing Columbine killers and other teenaged killers
in similar high school massacre advanced to next level of violence by "playing a
real-life video game - setting bombs in a public setting, such as a school, and
shooting any occupants").
25. See id. at 820-21 (noting "difference between the problem solving ap-
proach taken by children who play violent video games as compared to children
who play non-violent video games, such as Tetris and other puzzle or treasure-hunt
games"); Art Golab, Officer Organizes Video Game Turn-In, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 4,
2000, at 8 (discussing police officer Dan Huck's request that parents and children
turn in violent video games because of harm caused to children); Eileen Nechas &
Denise Foley, Researchers Look at Video Games' Link to Violence, Hous. CHRON., Feb.
22, 2001, at 6 (answering teenager's question to health columnists as to whether
his parents should be concerned about his playing violent video games).
26. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 820-21 (explaining violent video games
teach children to eliminate obstacles by killing, whereas non-violent video games
teach children to solve problems using creativity and patience); Golab, supra note
25, at 8 (stating violent video games teach children that violence creates means to
end); Nechas & Foley, supra note 25, at 6 (noting violent video games teach aggres-
sive solutions to problems).
2003]
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lence in general.2 7 The poignant devastation of human life at Col-
umbine High School in 1999, caused by two violent video game
enthusiasts attempting to incarnate Doom, vividly demonstrates how
these games can leave children completely unaffected by human
suffering and even death. 28 Such apathy begs the question of
whether these children know that in real life, they cannot just hit
the reset button and play again.
The case at issue in this Note is American Amusement Machine
Association v. Kendrick.29 In this case, the Seventh Circuit held it un-
constitutional to require parental or custodial supervision of chil-
dren at public arcades that house violent video games. 30
Accordingly, this Note begins with the history and background of
the First Amendment. 31 The general exceptions to First Amend-
ment protection follow. 32 This Note demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court, having yet to conclude whether violent imagery
renders material unprotected by the First Amendment and whether
video games qualify as speech, has relegated the debate to the cir-
cuit, district, and state courts; the district and state courts conclud-
ing that the First Amendment does not protect video games
because they are not speech. 33 In any event, the Supreme Court
has validated regulations abridging the freedom of speech when
children's health and morals were at stake. 34 This Note suggests
that based on legal precedent rendering video games unprotected
27. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 821-22 (illustrating, as example of desensi-
tization, trained soldiers in World War II hesitated to pull trigger eighty-five per-
cent of time, but after military utilized video games in training, such reluctance
diminished to five percent while willingness to kill rose to over ninety-five percent,
with Doom being one of video games used); Golab, supra note 25, at 8 (noting
desensitization effect).
28. See Charlie Condon, Should States Sue the Entertainment Industry as They Did
Big Tobacco? Yes: Hollywood Is Targeting Youth and Hitting the American Family Between
the Eyes, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 30, 2000, at 41-42 (explaining "Pied Piper"
effect of entertainment media in leading children toward destruction, and result-
ing potential for another high school massacre). For a discussion of the Colum-
bine killers, see infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
29. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
30. See id. at 580 (granting preliminary injunction preventing City from en-
forcing ordinance because harm ordinance would cause plaintiffs outweighed
City's need for ordinance).
31. For a discussion of the origins of the First Amendment, see infra notes 36-
43 and accompanying text.
32. For an account of First Amendment exceptions, see infra notes 44-88 and
accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to decide the issue and
the lower courts' analyses, including that of the Seventh Circuit in Kendrick, see
infra notes 89-157 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of children's diminished level of First Amendment pro-
tection, see infra notes 53-56, 66-67 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10: p. 69
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by the First Amendment and various studies on the detrimental ef-
fects of violent video games, the Seventh Circuit in Kendrick may
have overlooked both the dangers these games present to children
and the games' lack of speech, thereby overextending the First
Amendment.3 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution pronounces that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."3 6 The Framers devised this protection to counter the En-
glish suppression of speech, which criminalized the voicing of diver-
gent beliefs, specifically seditious libel.37 The First Amendment lies
at the heart of a democratic society encouraging diversity of
thought, belief, and self-expression. 38
While First Amendment function at the time of its conception
is clear, scholars continue to debate the Framers' overarching in-
tent.39 The means by which Americans express themselves have
evolved since 1791, and consequently, so too has the breadth of the
First Amendment.40 The Framers may never have anticipated cur-
tailing free speech to protect children or society as a whole.4 1 Tech-
nological advancements, which have caused a major proliferation
in the channels of communication and entertainment, have made
the United States government increasingly aware of the need to
limit speech. 42 Therefore, the Supreme Court has defined certain
35. For a critical analysis of the Kendrick court's holding, see infra notes 158-
223 and accompanying text.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 11.1.1, at 74849 (Aspen Law & Bus. 1997) (explaining England's Star Chamber,
which criminalized public criticism of King). ChiefJustice Holt wrote for the En-
glish court in 1704, "[i]f people should not be called to account for possessing...
an ill opinion of the government, no government can subsist. For it is very neces-
sary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of it." Id.
38. See id. § 11.1.2, at 750-56 (categorizing non-mutually exclusive theories of
First Amendment protection as self-governance, discovering truth, advancing au-
tonomy, and promoting tolerance).
39. See id. § 11.1.1, at 749 (stating little indication remains of Framers' intent
beyond abolishing restraints on speech in form of seditious libel).
40. For an analysis of various emerging modes of communication under the
First Amendment, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
41. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, § 11.1.1, at 749 ("[N]othing in the histori-
cal record sheds light on most of the free speech issues that face society and the
courts in the late twentieth century.").
42. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742(1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (noting "changes taking place in the law, the
2003]
7
Previte: Insert Coins to Slay - Regulating Children's Access to Violent Ar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
76 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
situations denying speech First Amendment protection if, for in-
stance, outweighed by some other interest or concern. 43
B. Exceptions to First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has declared that "the unconditional
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance .... All ideas ... have the full protection of the guaran-
ties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests. '"44 The Supreme Court has defined
certain interests that it deems substantial enough to outweigh First
Amendment protection. 45 For instance, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 6
the Court stated that speech inciting imminent lawless activity is not
protected under the First Amendment.47 Similarly, in Chaplinsky v.
technology, and the industrial structure related to telecommunications" have
made First Amendment challenges more difficult in decision upholding regulation
on offensive cable television broadcasts because highly accessible to children); see
also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-15 (2000) (in-
validating government's regulation of cable television indecency because content-
based and not least restrictive means to protect children from exposure); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-82 (1997) (striking down governmental restriction on
"indecent" and "patently offensive" communications over Internet because over-
broad); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (lim-
iting government's power to regulate indecent but not obscene pre-recorded "dial-
a-porn" telephone messages to only what is necessary to shield children, thereby
striking down total ban); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52
(1986) (holding city had power to regulate location of adult movie theaters); FCC
v. Paoifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (using nuisance rationale to validate
government's limitation on radio broadcasts of indecent but not obscene "Filthy
Words" to times when children would most likely not be exposed); Rothner v. City
of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 304 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding government had power to
regulate children's use of video games at arcades during school hours).
43. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) ("[There are] a
few limited areas [of speech], which are 'of such slight social value . . .that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in [restricting them]."' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942))); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ("The government may... regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest .. ").
44. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1957) (emphasis added)
("[Ilmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance.").
45. See IKA. V., 505 U.S. at 383 (stating categories of unprotected speech that
government has broad power to regulate are obscenity, defamation, and fighting
words).
46. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
47. See id. at 447 (striking down convictions of Ku Klux Klan members for
advocating violent action because violence was not imminent, and speech was
therefore mere advocacy, which First Amendment protects).
[Vol. 10: p. 69
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New Hampshire,48 the Court asserted that the government could for-
bid speech calculated to provoke a fight. 49
The Supreme Court carved out another exception to First
Amendment protection in Roth v. United States,50 where it held ob-
scenity to be unprotected speech. 51 The Court defined obscenity as
"material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to the pruri-
ent interest . material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts. '52 In Ginsberg v. New York, 53 the Court expanded the ob-
scenity exclusion by demanding a broader definition of what is ob-
scene for children because children receive a lower level of First
Amendment protection than adults.5 4 The Court stated:
Material which is protected for distribution to adults is not
necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction
upon its dissemination to children. . . . Because of the
State's exigent interest in preventing distribution to chil-
dren of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to
protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its com-
munity by barring the distribution to children of books
recognized to be suitable for adults. 55
The Court further held that parties need not present scientific evi-
dence to show a rational relationship between the regulation and
the objective of safeguarding children.56
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. See id. at 569-72 (defining fighting words as "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," in
upholding conviction of Jehovah's Witness for calling public marshal "a damned
Fascist" and "a God damned racketeer").
50. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
51. See id. at 492 (upholding conviction of businessman for mailing obscene
materials); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (following Roth,
and applying three-prong test for obscenity: (1) average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, would find that work, taken as whole, "appeals to
prurient interest;" (2) work depicts or describes, in patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by state; and (3) work, taken as whole, lacks serious
political, artistic, scientific, or literary value).
52. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
53. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
54. See id. at 636 (upholding constitutionality of statute that forbade sale of
"girlie" magazines depicting nudity to minors).
55. Id. (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y.
1966)).
56. See id. at 642-43 ("We do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain
criteria of legislation.' . . . We therefore cannot say that [the statute at issue], in
defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17,
has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm."
(quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911))).
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In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,57 the Court likewise held that
"[t] he States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in regulat-
ing the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places
of public accommodation. . .. "58 The Court relied on a report on
pornography "[indicating] that there is at least an arguable correla-
tion between obscene material and crime." 59 The Court thus held
that the First Amendment does not attach to speech or material
that lacks "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as
communication."60 One year later, the Supreme Court expanded
this principle, holding that the First Amendment protects conduct
or speech only if intended to convey a particularized message and
if, in the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood is great that
those who view the message will understand it.61
The Supreme Court generated the most prevalent test for de-
termining whether an abridgement of speech is constitutional in
United States v. O'Brien.62 There, the Court stated that "a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating [speech] can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 63 A regula-
tion is valid if it satisfies the following four requirements:
1. It is within the constitutional police power of government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free speech; and
4. The regulation is no more restrictive than necessary to fur-
ther the governmental interest.64
Examining the first constraint, the Court has held that the gov-
ernment acts within its constitutional police power when it regu-
lates to protect the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the
57. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id. at 58.
60. Id. at 67.
61. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (noting appellant's
peaceful use of flag was "pointed expression of anguish ... about the then-current
domestic and foreign affairs of ... government," and thus protected by First
Amendment).
62. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (validating statute that prohibited destruction of
draft card because of substantial interest in Congress's need to raise and support
armies).
63. Id. at 376.
64. See id. at 377 (finding 1965 Amendment to § 12(b) (3) of Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act compliant with all four requirements, validating con-
viction of O'Brien for violating Act).
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community. 65 The Court has expressed more specifically that pro-
tecting the safety, morals, and general well-being of children is a
substantial interest that may justify abridging speech.66 For this rea-
son, courts have upheld bans on distributing obscenity to children,
but not adults. 67
To overcome the second O'Brien constraint, the government
must show that the regulated activity frustrates the government's
substantial interest.68 The government need not submit its own
novel studies as evidence. 69 It merely must demonstrate the reason-
ableness of concluding that the regulation will combat interference
with the government's substantial interests. 70 For instance, in City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,7 1 the court of appeals had held
that the studies presented, showing negative effects of adult thea-
65. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (stating city's efforts to protect public health and safety are un-
doubtedly within its police powers); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37
(1968) (noting state's power to protect health, safety, welfare, and morals of com-
munity when threatened by distribution of objectionable material to children);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (recognizing importance of police
power); see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.").
66. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 ("Because of the state's exigent interest in
preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its
power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring
the distribution to children .... " (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d
668, 671 (N.Y. 1966))); see also Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989) (finding compelling interest in "protecting physical and psychological
well-being of minors"); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir.
1991) (validating restriction on playing video games during school hours due to
government's substantial interest in encouraging minors to complete high school
education).
67. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (confirming government's compelling interest in protecting children under
age of eighteen from indecent broadcasts).
68. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-82 (finding ban on destruction of draft cards
rational regulation for ensuring Congress's ability to raise armies because govern-
ment's purpose of issuing draft cards would be defeated if certificates were de-
stroyed or mutilated).
69. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)
("The First Amendment does not require a city ... to conduct new studies or
produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem that the city addresses."); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-82 (upholding constitu-
tionality of statute despite government's failure to present studies or evidence
showing harm).
70. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377-78 (basing its decision that ordinance fur-
thered substantial interest on reasonableness that prohibiting mutilation of draft
cards would promote Congress's efficiency in raising armies, not on scientific evi-
dence of such).
71. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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ters on communities, were insufficient to justify regulation because
they were conducted in other cities. 72 The Supreme Court subse-
quently reversed that decision, concluding that Renton did not
need to conduct its own studies. 73 The city could rely on studies
conducted in Seattle "so long as whatever evidence the city relie [d]
upon [was] reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that
the city [was addressing].'74 The Seattle study on the negative ef-
fects of adult films was sufficient to show that the ordinance fur-
thered a substantial governmental interest because it was
reasonably related to Renton's substantial interest in preventing
neighborhood blight through its regulation of adult theaters. 75
Addressing the third constraint, courts have created an impor-
tant distinction, which has become a primary test for determining
whether a regulation of speech is constitutional. 76 This is the dis-
tinction between content-neutral and content-based speech. 77 The
O'Brien Court indicated that for a regulation to be valid, its purpose
must be to banish the "nonspeech element" of the speech alone,
and not the speech itself.78 This "nonspeech element" represents
the "noncommunicative impact" of the speech.79 For instance, in
O'Brien, the speech element was the burning of a draft card, and
72. See id. at 50 (citing court of appeals in its criticism of city's justifications
for ordinance as being "conclusory and speculative").
73. See id. at 50-52 ("We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city an
unnecessarily rigid burden of proof.").
74. Id.
75. See id. (disregarding fact that Seattle chose different method of adult thea-
ter zoning than that chosen by Renton because irrelevant to holding).
76. For a discussion of the distinction between content-neutral and content-
based speech, see infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (O'ConnorJ,
plurality opinion) (applying O'Brien test to public indecency statute restricting
nude dancers in adult entertainment establishments); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 64243 (1994) (applying O'Brien test to "must-carry" provisions of
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which com-
pelled broadcasters to carry signals of certain local television stations), affJd, 520
U.S. 180 (1997); Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48 (evaluating content-neutrality of zoning
ordinance regulating adult theaters); Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63,
66 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing content-neutrality of law prohibiting sale to minors
of trading cards that depict heinous crime, element of heinous crime, or heinous
criminal); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991) (evaluat-
ing content-neutrality of ordinance prohibiting children from playing video games
when school in session).
78. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (distinguishing
content-based from content-neutral speech); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (finding
regulation content-neutral because intended to avoid secondary effect of adult the-
aters, and not dissemination of offensive speech).
79. See, e.g., Erie, 529 U.S. at 291 (finding ordinance on public nudity content-
neutral because aimed at controlling negative noncommunicative impact, rather
than expression itself).
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the nonspeech element, or noncommunicative impact, was the frus-
tration it caused the government in regulating the classification and
conscription of manpower for military service. 80 Thus, if desire to
control the secondary effects of speech that frustrates the govern-
ment's substantial interest motivates regulation, it is content-neu-
tral.8 1 If, however, the regulation aims to restrict the content of the
speech, in the form of a specific opinion, view, or belief, then it is
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.82
To satisfy the fourth O'Brien constraint, the ordinance must not
be more restrictive than necessary to further the government's sub-
stantial interest.83 In other words, the regulation must be "narrowly
tailored" to serve the important governmental interest.84 For in-
stance, if the substantial interest is protecting children from expo-
sure to obscene magazines, then the regulation is not narrowly
tailored if it applies to children and adults alike; it is, however, nar-
rowly tailored if it applies only to children.85 A restriction on
speech must preserve ample alternative channels of communica-
tion for the restricted material.86 For example, a valid regulation
on children's exposure to harmful material allows the communica-
tor of the message to continue distributing his or her materials to
80. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 ("The power of Congress to classify and con-
script manpower for military service is 'beyond question."' (quoting Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948))).
81. See id. at 382 (validating statute because constrained to noncommunica-
tive aspect of O'Brien's conduct and not aimed at its specific content).
82. See, e.g., Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding ordinance content-based and invalid due to lack of apparent secondary
effects of banned trading cards).
83. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82 (finding regulation valid because it prohib-
its conduct that interferes with government's substantial interest and does nothing
more).
84. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989) (reading
O'Brien requirement of least restrictive means to infer that restriction be narrowly
tailored). The Court stated that "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so
long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Id.
85. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (find-
ing regulation of pre-recorded sexual phone messages not narrowly tailored be-
cause total ban, when "credit card, access code, and scrambling rules were a
satisfactory [and less-restrictive] solution to the problem of keeping indecent dial-
a-porn messages out of the reach of minors"); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d
297, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding ordinance narrowly tailored because prohib-
ited persons under seventeen only from playing video games during school hours).
86. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303 (finding ordinance narrowly tailored because
it left open ample alternative channels for communication of information).
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adults. 8 7 This condition prevents excessive bans when less harsh
restrictions would accomplish the objective as effectively.88
C. Violence and Video Games
While the Supreme Court maintains the constitutionality of
certain restrictions on freedom of speech because of more impor-
tant state interests, it has yet to conclude whether the negative ef-
fects from children's exposure to violence is one of those critical
interests.8 9 It has revealed that television, radio, film, and
magazines are all within the ambit of speech.90 Meanwhile, it re-
mains unclear whether video games qualify as speech for First
Amendment purposes.9'
Numerous district and state courts have held that the First
Amendment does not protect video games because video games
lack sufficient expressive content.9 2 Recently, in Interactive Digital
87. For examples of what has and has not satisfied the "narrowly tailored"
requirement, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
88. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (interpreting least restrictive means require-
ment advanced by O'Brien to mean, "[s]o long as the means chosen are not sub-
stantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," the
ordinance survives).
89. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (inferring obscenity, fighting words, and defamation are only cat-
egories of unprotected speech that government has power to regulate as to adults),
rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Patricia M. Wald, Doing Right by Our Kids:
A Case Study in the Perils of Making Policy on Television Violence, 23 U. BALT. L. REv.
397, 407 (1994) ("[T]he law [may] some day recognize a category of violent mate-
rial so outrageous and lacking in information or artistic merit as to fall outside the
First Amendment altogether, in the manner of obscenity, but thus far such a con-
cept is confined to the law journals alone.").
90. SeeGinsbergv. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968) (applying First Amend-
ment to "girlie" magazines); see also Borger by Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97,
99-101 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (applying First Amendment to videos shown in class-
rooms). For a discussion of other applications of the First Amendment to various
modes of speech, see supra notes 42-88 and accompanying text.
91. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 302-03 ("confess[ing] an inability to comprehend
fully the video game[s] of the 1990s," and thus whether games convey to users
significant artistic or educational message worthy of First Amendment protection);
see also Matthew Hamilton, Comment, Graphic Violence in Computer and Video Games:
Is Legislation the Answer? 100 DICK. L. REV. 181, 190 (1995) (noting Supreme
Court's silence as to whether video games warrant First Amendment protection,
and need for resolution).
92. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("Courts almost unanimously [have] held that video
games lack[ ) the expressive element necessary to trigger the First Amendment.");
see also Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass.
1983) ("It cannot be said that a person has a constitutional right to play video
games in an arcade that is not an 'accessory to or incidental to only recreational
business use."' (quoting Malden, Mass., Revised Ordinance ch. 13, § 34(2) (June
2, 1982))); Am.'s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep't of Bldgs.,
536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding "video games do not implicate
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Software Association v. St. Louis County,93 the district court likened
video games to Bingo, and "fail[ed] to see how [they] express ideas,
impressions, feelings, or information" necessary to trigger First
Amendment protection. 94 The court further equated video games
with sports unprotected by the First Amendment, such as baseball,
hockey, and boxing, and recognized that video games do not be-
come a form of expression simply because they are in video form or
because they contain violence. 95
While district and state courts hold "almost unanimously" that
the First Amendment does not protect video games, the Supreme
Court has yet to respond. 96 With such limited guidance, circuit
courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court's unprotected
categories both to ordinances intended to deter violence and to
those restricting video games.9 7 Kendrick is the only circuit court
First Amendment [rights]" because they are not meant to inform); Caswell v. Li-
censing Comm'n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983) (concluding First Amendment
protection does not extend to video games because they are merely technologically
advanced games).
93. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
94. See id. at 1134 ("The [c]ourt has trouble seeing how an ordinary game
with no First Amendment protection, can suddenly become expressive when tech-
nology is used to present it in 'video' form.").
95. See id. at 1134-35. The court reasoned:
[T] he game of baseball is not a form of expression entitled to free speech
protection. It is often times surrounded by speech and expressive ideas
- music between innings, fans carrying signs with expressive messages -
however, these expressive elements do not transform the game of base-
ball into "speech." Rather it remains, just what it is - a game. Nor does
the [c]ourt think there is some magical transformation when this game of
baseball appears in video form. The objectives are still the same - to
score runs-and the only difference is a player pushes a button or swings
a "computer bat," rather than swinging a wooden bat.... [Likewise,] if
within [a] hockey game two players get in a fight, or someone gets sliced
with a hockey stick and blood flies, the game does not suddenly become a
form of expression. Another applicable analogy is boxing, where the
main objective is to punch and knock out the opponent. However, box-
ing is still just a sport, not speech. In the same light, video games do not
become a form of expression just because they contain violence.
Id.
96. For a discussion of the district and state courts' treatment of violence and
video games under the First Amendment, see supra notes 92-95, infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
97. See Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding
it unnecessary to determine if carefully delimited and properly tailored restrictions
on distribution of violence to minors can ever pass strict scrutiny); Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no need to
decide if states can prescribe dissemination of material depicting violence to mi-
nors); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991) (demonstrat-
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case that has dealt with both issues together in its consideration of
an ordinance restricting children's access to violent video games.9 8
The Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of a re-
striction on children's access to video games during school hours in
Rothner v. City of Chicago.9" The court held that the ordinance was
constitutional.10 0 In reaching this conclusion, the court first found
the restriction to be content-neutral because it was aimed at all
video games, regardless of content.1 0 1 Second, it held that the gov-
ernment had a substantial interest in improving children's educa-
tion because there are "few interests more compelling than [the]
interest in insuring that children receive an adequate educa-
tion."'0 2 Third, the court inferred that the ordinance furthered
that interest because children would be encouraged to be in school,
instead of at an arcade.' 0 3 Finally, the court concluded that the
regulation was narrowly tailored because it left open alternative
channels of expression by allowing the arcades to be available to
adults, as well as to children on weekends, during school vacations,
and after school hours on weekdays.1 0 4 What is of major signifi-
cance to this Note is that the court refused to say whether all video
98. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574-80 (7th
Cir. 2001). For the background and analysis of this case, see infra notes 121-57 and
accompanying text.
99. 929 F.2d at 302-04 (arguing ordinance's purpose, to encourage all minors
to complete at least high school education and to discourage truancy, was unre-
lated to content of speech). Moreover, the ordinance was valid because it left
open alternate channels for communication of information while being narrowly
tailored to serve an important governmental interest. See id.
100. See id. at 303-04 (declaring ordinance content-neutral, narrowly tailored,
and in furtherance of state's legitimate interest).
101. See id. at 303. For a discussion of the content-neutral requirement under
a First Amendment analysis, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
102. Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303. For a discussion of the protections of the safety,
morals, and general well-being of children as substantial interests, see supra notes
65-67 and accompanying text.
103. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303-04. The court did not conclude expressly
that the ordinance met this requirement, but it can be inferred that it did through
the following language: "'Education provides the basic tools by which individuals
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all' [and] ... the
City's interest in encouraging these students to complete high school is certainly
sufficient to justify the ordinance." Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982)). For a further discussion of what courts look for in deciding whether an
ordinance furthers a substantial state interest, see supra notes 68-75 and accompa-
nying text.
104. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303-04. For an explanation of the "narrowly tai-
lored" requirement, see supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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games lack artistic merit, and thus First Amendment protection. 105
It, therefore, left this question open for debate.' 0 6
While the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the constitutional-
ity of regulating video games, it has addressed violence by holding
that an ordinance regulating violent rental videos was unconstitu-
tional in Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster.'07 It began by
explaining that violence is different from obscenity, and thus does
not fall under the obscenity exception.'08 The court further held
that because the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to promote a
substantial state interest, it could not withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. 10 9 In particular, because the state failed to define specifically
the violence it intended to regulate, the statute was an outright ban
on all violence and therefore "unconstitutionally vague." 10 The or-
dinance was also invalid because it was not narrowly tailored to tar-
get the precise source of the alleged harmful effects."' Still, the
court refused to answer the more difficult question of whether the
government may ever validly restrict access to violent material by
abridging speech. 1 2 For instance, had the ordinance been nar-
rowly tailored, it is unclear whether the court would have upheld
the restriction. 113
105. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303 (confessing court's inability to fully compre-
hend modern video games sufficiently to assess whether some video games rise to
level of art or literature, or if they are all merely evolved pinball machines).
106. See id. ("[T]he City frankly cautions us that the issue is 'difficult' and
reminds us that we need not decide it.").
107. 968 F.2d 684, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1992).
108. See id. at 688 (stating without depictions or descriptions of sexual con-
duct, material containing violence alone cannot be obscene). For a discussion of
what qualifies as obscene for First Amendment purposes, see supra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text.
109. See Video, 968 F.2d at 689. The court held that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored because it did not describe the type of violence it proscribed and
thus "[a] more precise law limited to slasher films and specifically defining key
terms would be less burdensome on protected expression." Id. For a discussion of
the "narrowly tailored" requirement, see supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
110. See Video, 968 F.2d at 689 (explaining that to survive vagueness challenge,
statute must provide ordinary person reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited and provide precise standards for those who apply statute).
111. See id. For an explanation of the "narrowly tailored" requirement, see
supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
112. See Video, 968 F.2d at 689 ("[W]e need not decide whether states can
legitimately proscribe dissemination of material depicting violence to minors be-
cause Missouri's statute cannot survive strict scrutiny.").
113. See id. at 691. The court emphasized the need for precise drafting and
clear purpose when First Amendment rights are at stake. See id. It noted, however,
that its holding did not effect whether a state can restrict dissemination of violent
videos to children if the ordinance is properly drafted because "we do not belittle
the State's interest in the well-being of minors." Id.
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The Second Circuit also tackled the issue of whether the gov-
ernment can regulate the distribution of violent material to chil-
dren in Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gulotta.' 1 4 The court invalidated a
county ordinance that banned trading cards of caricatured
criminals because it was content-based.11 5 The court further found
the ordinance invalid because there was no proof that it would sat-
isfy the legitimate state interest of "protecting the psychological
well-being of minors and .. .combating juvenile crime."' 1 6 The
court held that without proof of the alleged negative effects to the
community from children's use of these cards, the regulation's ef-
fect in satisfying the state interest was mere "speculation or
surmise," and thus not sufficient to justify abridging speech.' 17 Due
to insubstantial support for the ordinance, the court concluded it
was unnecessary, and therefore not narrowly tailored to further a
legitimate state interest.' 18 The court did not hold that such a regu-
lation could never exist to restrict violence because it refused to ex-
pand its holding beyond the facts of this case.' 19 Instead, it skirted
the issue of whether the regulation would have been valid if the
defendants had offered proof that the cards' violent depictions in-
terfered with the state's substantial interest in preventing juvenile
crime. 1 20
III. AMERiCAN AMUSEMENT MACHINE ASSOCIATION V. KENDRICK
At issue in Kendrick was whether an Indianapolis ordinance re-
stricting children's access to coin-operated violent video games vio-
lated the First Amendment right to free speech.' 2' Specifically, the
114. 134 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
115. See id. at 66-67 (explaining because ordinance was content-based, it was
presumptively invalid and had to pass strict scrutiny to overcome presumption).
For a discussion of what constitutes content-based speech, see supra notes 77-82
and accompanying text.
116. Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 67-68. The court explained that the only study
presented was that of a connection between television violence and juvenile vio-
lence. See id. at 68. This was insufficient to show that crime trading cards in-
creased juvenile violence because "TV is a more vibrant medium than trading
cards .... Id.
117. See id. at 67-68 (noting county's own experts and supervisor who drafted
ordinance conceded to having no support for ordinance).
118. See id. at 68. For a discussion of the "narrowly tailored" requirement, see
supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
119. See Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 67 (finding it unnecessary "to determine whether
carefully delimited and properly tailored restrictions on distribution of non-ob-
scene but otherwise harmful speech to minors .. .can ever [be valid]").
120. See id. (limiting holding to facts of case).
121. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir.
2001). The court recognized that the issue was whether a violation of the video
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challenged ordinance forbade persons under the age of eighteen
from using any amusement machine deemed "harmful to minors"
without the accompaniment of a parent, guardian, or other custo-
dian.122 The ordinance defined "harmful to minors" as "an amuse-
ment machine that predominantly appeals to minors' morbid
interest in violence . .. [and contains] graphic violence."' 2 3
The plaintiffs in this case were the manufacturers of video
games and their trade association. 12 4 They sought a preliminary in-
junction against the City of Indianapolis to bar enforcement of the
ordinance because they claimed it violated their freedom of expres-
sion. 12 5 The district court held that the ordinance would violate
the First Amendment only if the City lacked a reasonable basis for
its grounds that the ordinance would protect children from
harm. 126 The district court found a reasonable basis derived from
empirical studies by psychologists, which documented a link be-
tween playing violent video games and aggressive attitudes and be-
havior in children, along with other samples of extensive literature
demonstrating that violence in the media evokes aggressive feel-
ings. 127 The court ruled in favor of the City and an appeal en-
sued. 128 Thereafter, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
game manufacturers' First Amendment rights occurred. See id. While there might
have been a claim for the children's First Amendment rights also, the court did
not address it. See id.
122. See id. Though the ordinance was enacted in 2000, it had not yet gone
into effect when the plaintiffs filed their complaint. See City of Indianapolis and
Marion County, Ind., General Ordinance 72-2000 (July 10, 2000). The ordinance
applied only to establishments where there were five or more video games in one
place. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. In addition, it required appropriate warning
signs and that the restricted machines be separated by a partition from the other
machines in the area. See id.
123. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (S.D.
Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). The ordinance's definition of video
games that are "harmful to minors" also included those that appeal to "minors'
prurient interest in sex," and that contain "strong sexual content." See id. (quoting
City of Indianapolis and Marion County, Ind., General Ordinance 72-2000 (July
10, 2000)). The ordinance further defined "graphic violence" as "an amusement
machine's visual depiction or representation or realistic serious injury to a human
or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation,
dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration." Id. Because
the plaintiffs in this case did not manufacture video games with sexual content, the
only issue was the restriction on violent content. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573.
124. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573 (explaining plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin,
as violation of freedom of expression, enforcement of ordinance that would limit
minors' access to video games depicting graphic violence).
125. See id. at 573 (detailing plaintiffs' claim).
126. See id. at 574 (outlining district court's analysis).
127. See id. (explaining district court's finding with regard to City's evidence).
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court's ruling due to the "entirely conjectural nature of the [ordi-
nance's] benefits" to the City.1 29 The court concluded that denying
the injunction would impose more harm to the plaintiffs than the
harm a preliminary injunction would cause to the City.1 30
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Basis for Granting Injunction
The Seventh Circuit in Kendrick explained its holding on four
grounds.131 First, the court stated that violence is not a category of
speech excludable from First Amendment protection. 132 It claimed
that the ordinance attempted to equate violence with sex to invoke
the obscenity exception.133 Conversely, the court distinguished vio-
lence from obscenity by indicating the discrepancy in the concerns
behind both. 34 It remarked "[t]he main worry about obscenity,
the main reason for its proscription, is not that it is harmful, which
is the worry behind the Indianapolis ordinance, but that it is offen-
sive."'135 The court inferred that the courts that have upheld regula-
tions of obscenity did not intend for the obscenity exception to
encompass violence because they were safeguarding against an en-
tirely different effect. 136
Second, the court claimed that violence should not be a sepa-
rate exclusion from First Amendment protection because it would
be "deforming" to shield minors from depictions of violence. 137
129. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580 (inferring plaintiffs would stand good
chance to win if City chose to continue fight).
130. See id. ("[Plaintiffs] will suffer irreparable harm if the ordinance is per-
mitted to go into effect, because compliance with it will impose costs on them of
altering their facilities and will also cause them to lose revenue.").
131. See id. at 574-80 (noting although more narrowly drawn statute might
survive constitutional challenge, that was not issue court needed to decide in in-
stant case).
132. See id. at 574 (stating violence has not been qualified yet as expressive
form that can be regulated on basis of content).
133. See id. ("[T]he City asks us to squeeze the provision on violence into a
familiar legal pigeonhole, that of obscenity .... [This] position is [not] compel-
ling [however]. Violence and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable
depiction ....").
134. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574-75 ("We shall discover some possible inter-
sections between the concerns that animate obscenity laws and the concerns that
animate the Indianapolis ordinance . . . . but in general the concerns are
different.").
135. Id. at 574 (differentiating between obscenity and violence).
136. See id. (noting ordinance does not fall under obscenity exception be-
cause offensiveness was not basis of ordinance restricting violent content).
137. See id. at 577-78 (implying children learn survival skills through exposure
to violence).
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The court reasoned that barring minors' exposure to realistic
images of violence would "leave them unequipped to cope with the
world as we know it."138 This reasoning derived from the court's
belief that a restriction on violent video games translates into a ban
on violent imagery altogether, including some classic works of art,
literature, and movies.' 3 9 The court raised and quickly dismissed
the distinction that playing a violent video game is more interactive
and thus potentially more harmful than reading a classic novel with
depictions of violence, such as War and Peace, or even a classic fairy
tale.140 It reasoned that such books are equally interactive because
"[I] iterature, when it is successful draws the reader into the story,
makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them
and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as
the reader's own."1 41 Therefore, the court found no substantive
difference between this ordinance's regulation of violent video
games and a ban on art, literature, or movies, in which the depic-
tions of violence are important to a child's education and under-
standing of human conflict.1 42
Third, the court held that the City presented no evidence that
violent video games actually cause children to act violently.' 43 It
stated that "the [invalidity of] the Indianapolis ordinance could be
overcome by social scientific evidence, but it has not been.' 44 This
is because the psychology studies on which the City relied demon-
strated only that playing violent video games causes children to be
more aggressive in their behavior and attitudes. 145 Accordingly, the
court stated that the studies "are not evidence that violent video
138. Id. (recognizing value in children's learning violence).
139. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577-78. The court listed Tolstoy's War and Peace,
Homer's The Odyssey, Dante's The Divine Comedy, Mary Shelly's Frankenstein, Bram
Stoker's Dracula, works of Edgar Allan Poe, and classic fairy tales of Grimm, Ander-
sen, and Perrault as comparable to video games in their depictions of violence. See
id. at 577.
140. See id. (illustrating violence in "War and Peace with its graphic descrip-
tions of execution by firing squad, death in childbirth, and death from war
wounds").
141. Id.
142. See id. ("People are unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-
minded adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual
bubble.").
143. See id. at 578-79 (noting studies presented do not show that video games
cause violent acts, as opposed to merely making players feel aggressive).
144. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579.
145. See id. at 574. The studies were reported in Craig A. Anderson & Karen
E. Dill, Personality Processes and Individual Differences - Video Games and Aggressive
Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 772 (2000). See id. at 578.
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games are any more harmful to the consumer or to the public
safety than violent movies or other violent, but passive, entertain-
ments." 146 The court presumed that the City was attempting to ex-
periment with regulating violence, and had chosen video games
first before proceeding to movies.1 47 The court asserted, however,
that "[v]iolent video games played in public places are a tiny frac-
tion of the media violence to which modern American children are
exposed.' 148 Therefore, it questioned why the City believed it
could isolate video games played in public places, when no such
power to regulate existed for other sources of violence in the me-
dia, such as in movies. 149
Finally, the court stated that the plaintiffs' video games con-
tained cartoon characters, thus posing no real threat of violence. 150
The court reasoned that "[n] o one would mistake [the images] for
photographs of real people.' 51 The court suggested that the ordi-
nance might have been valid if it had specified that it applied only
to games that "used actors and simulated real death and mutilation
convincingly[.]' 1 52 Because the ordinance did not do so, but in-
stead applied to the most fantastical images of violence, the court
concluded that it was invalid. 153
Based on the four premises above, the court found the Indian-
apolis ordinance to be an unconstitutional infringement on
speech.154 The court ultimately reasoned, "given the entirely con-
jectural nature of the benefits of the ordinance to the people of
Indianapolis, the harm of a preliminary injunction to the City must
be reckoned slight, and outweighed by the harm that denying the
injunction would impose on the plaintiffs.' 1 5 5 The court believed
that the ordinance was not worth the cost to the plaintiffs of effectu-
146. Id. at 579.
147. See id. ("We can imagine the City's arguing that it would like to ban vio-
lent movies too, but that either this is infeasible or the City has to start somewhere
and should not be discouraged from experimenting.").
148. Id. at 579.
149. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579 (asserting violent video games are no more
violent than what is currently available to children on television and in movies).
150. See id. The court distinguished the facts of this case from those in Gins-
berg by pointing out that the nude pictures distributed in magazines were of real
people, while the images in video games are mere "fantasy mayhem." See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 579-80.
153. See id. (claiming if ordinance had been more narrowly drawn, it may
have survived constitutional challenge).
154. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580. For a discussion of the Kendrick court's
analysis, see supra notes 131-53, infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
155. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580.
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ating it because there was no scientific proof of benefits. 1 56 There-
fore, the court struck down the ordinance. 15 7
B. How the Seventh Circuit Erred
The court's first argument that violence is not obscenity is
proper. 158 Its remaining grounds for striking down the Indianapo-
lis ordinance are problematic however.159 The court's second argu-
ment, that the ordinance is comparable to bans on classic works of
art, literature, and film, is untenable.1 60 The critical difference is
that violent arcade games are not a source of education, expression,
or communication of ideas.' 6 The court has held that to warrant
First Amendment protection, the regulated material must transmit
a particularized message or have artistic or educational signifi-
cance. 162 Such content is not evident in video games as it is in clas-
156. See id. The court emphasized the costs to the plaintiffs if required to
alter their facilities and their potential loss of revenue. See id.
157. See id. (granting plaintiffs preliminary injunction).
158. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir.
1992) ("Material that contains violence but not depictions or descriptions of sex-
ual conduct cannot be obscene. Thus videos depicting only violence do not fall
within the legal definition of obscenity for either minors or adults."'.
159. For a discussion of how the court's analysis is unsound, see infra notes
160-223 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion on how video games are effectively different from other
media, see infra notes 161-63, 165-70 and accompanying text.
161. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1134-35 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (concluding "video games have more in common
with [non-expressive] board games and sports than they do with motion pictures"
and are thus unprotected by First Amendment); Am.'s Best Family Showplace
Corp. v. City of NewYork, Dep't of Bldgs, 536 F. Supp. 170, 173-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(" [M]otion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas....
[Alternatively,] video games are [in no way] meant to inform. Rather, a video
game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertain-
ment with no informational element."); Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n, 444 N.E.2d
922, 927 (Mass. 1983) ("[A]ny communication or expression of ideas that occurs
during the playing of a video game is purely inconsequential .... [V]ideo games
are more technologically advanced games than pinball or chess. That technologi-
cal advancement alone, however, does not impart First Amendment status to what
is an otherwise unprotected game."); see also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (suggesting
video games fall in "gray area" and that government has greater scope for regula-
tion in this area, which may be outside boundaries of First Amendment), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
162. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (rejecting notion
that all conduct intended to express idea can be labeled speech, and holding that
defendant's act of displaying U.S. flag with peace symbol in apartment window
warranted First Amendment protection because flags are historically symbolic and
there was intent to convey particularized message that would be understood); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) ("Where communication of ideas
... is not involved... [the First Amendment] does not bar the State from acting to
protect legitimate state interests."); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303
2003]
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sic novels, which are distributed to children in schools for
educational purposes, or in movies, which may be intended to in-
form or to depict art. 163 In particular, novels are so vastly different
from video games that the analogy fails.' 64 The images of violence
in novels are created only in the reader's imagination, not on a
screen for impressionable eyes to see. 165 The studies with which the
government was concerned were those that demonstrate a link be-
tween children's seeing an act and subsequently acting it out. 16 6
There are no referenced studies showing that reading about vio-
lence incites children to commit violent acts.1 67
The court's flawed analogizing of video games with movies and
literature also dismisses the obvious distinction that video games
are entirely interactive. 168 Such interaction requires that players be
active participants in the violence.1 69 Therefore, the video game is
(7th Cir. 1991) (inferring there must be significant artistic or informative message
for First Amendment protection); Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582
F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983) (finding no constitutional protection for playing
of video games because no advancement of beliefs or ideas); Am.'s Best, 536 F.
Supp. at 173 ("[B]efore entertainment is accorded First Amendment protection
there must be some element of information or some idea being communicated.
That idea is completely lacking [in video games]." (citing S.E. Promotions Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556-58 (1975))); see also Wald, supra note 89, at 407 (1994)
(suggesting video games lack information or artistic merit and thus fall outside
First Amendment).
163. See Am. 's Best, 536 F. Supp. at 174 ("That some of these games 'talk' to
the participant, play music, or have written instructions does not provide the miss-
ing element of 'information' [present in protected fiction and film.]").
164. For a discussion of how video games are effectively different from other
entertainment forms, see supra notes 161-63, infra notes 165-70 and accompanying
text.
165. For a description of the violent content in some modern video games,
see supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
166. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.
2001). For a discussion of the studies presented in Kendrick, see supra notes 127,
143-46 and accompanying text.
167. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574 (discussing violent literature, but failing to
note any examples of increased violence in children as result of reading).
168. See Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3. The author explained:
[V]iolent video games may be more dangerous than violent films or mu-
sic for several reasons. First, they force the player to identify with the
aggressor, the character doing the killing. .... And it is aggressive behav-
ior (kills, for example) that gets you [rewards] .... Second, the player is
not a spectator but a participant .... Third .... video-game playing may
be clinically addictive.
Id.; see also Stephen McGinty, Mr. Movies Faces the Final Act, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 9,
2001, at 6 ("We're dealing with vastly disparate art forms. The video game is inter-
active. Movies, music, television broadcasts are not."), available at 2001 WL
26026672.
169. See Holleman, supra note 18, at EV3 (noting dangers of child player be-
ing participant in violent activity in video games); McGinty, supra note 168, at 6
(discussing same).
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a much more dangerous medium by which to present violence to
children than television, film, art, or literature because video games
require a certain level of violent activity to win, such as shooting,
punching, stabbing, or killing, all at the push of a button or tweak
of a joystick. 170
In any event, the plaintiffs in Kendrick failed to meet their bur-
den of proving how their video games were intended to inform,
teach, or contain a particular opinion, belief, or message. 171 The
district court in Interactive Digital Software stated, "it is the obligation
of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to
demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies."'172 Conse-
quently, without proof as to the expressive or educational content
of the plaintiffs' video games, and because courts have character-
ized video games as non-expressive entertainment, the First Amend-
ment does not apply. 173 It follows that the court did not need to
apply the O'Brien test at all, but should have applied the less strict
standard used in Ginsberg and Paris instead. 174
Accordingly, the court's third argument mistakenly asserts that
studies showing a link between violent video games and violent ten-
dencies are insufficient to support a substantial interest.'75 The
court found the government's studies insufficient because they
showed only that violent video games caused children to feel more
aggressive, but not necessarily to act violently.1 76 This was im-
proper, however, because the Court in Paris, following Ginsberg, re-
170. For a discussion of how violent video games are more dangerous to chil-
dren than other entertainment forms due to required level of interaction, see
supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
171. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. County of St. Louis, 200 F. Supp.
2d 1126, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("[P]laintiffs failed to meet their burden of show-
ing that video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amend-
ment."). See generally Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 572-80 (failing to state how video games
inform, teach, or communicate message).
172. 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (discussing plaintiff's burden of proving First
Amendment protection because "there is no presumption that all conduct is
expressive").
173. For a discussion of courts' analyses of video games as unprotected by the
First Amendment, see supra notes 92-95, 161-70 and accompanying text.
174. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-61 (1973) (following
Ginsberg's rejection of heightened scrutiny); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
64143 (1968) (rejecting heightened scrutiny where no First Amendment protec-
tion exists, and applying less strict standard). For a list of the O'Brien factors, see
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
175. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 64143 (requiring finding only that regulation
was not irrational means of furthering interest). But see Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578-
79 (belying Ginsberg by applying stricter standard of proof).
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quired only a showing of "at least an arguable correlation between
obscene material and crime. 177  The Court continued that
"[n] othing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching.., a
conclusion [as to key relationships of human existence] and acting
on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or
empirical data." 17s The City satisfied this standard by demonstrat-
ing what the Paris Court labeled "an arguable correlation" through
its presentation of two empirical studies showing a connection be-
tween violent video games and violent tendencies. 79
The Ginsberg Court also held that scientific evidence is unnec-
essary to prove that an ordinance is rationally related to a substan-
tial interest.180 If the government provides a study to show a link
between the substantial interest and the ordinance, it need not be
entirely conclusive. 181 The Court relied on "the growing consensus
of commentators that while [the studies presented] all agree that a
causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that
a causal link has not been disproved either."' 18 2 The Court con-
cluded that because it was impossible to disprove a causative link, it
"[could not] say that [the regulation had] no rational relation to
the objective of safeguarding [minors] from harm."183 This inabil-
ity to find an irrational relationship led the Court to uphold the
regulation. 184
177. See Paris, 413 U.S. at 58-61 ("Although there is no conclusive proof of a
connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of
Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might
exist." (emphasis added)).
178. Id. at 63.
179. See id. at 58; see also Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574. For a discussion of the
studies presented in Kendrick, see supra notes 127, 143-46 and accompanying text.
180. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43. The Ginsberg Court noted that the legis-
lature believed "that [the] material condemned ... is a 'basic factor in impairing
the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger to
the people of the state."' Id. at 641 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (McKinney
1965)). The Court doubted how scientific the proof of causation was, but found it
sufficient to validate the regulation. See id.; see also Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Action court pronounced:
[T] he Supreme Court has never suggested that a scientific demonstration
of psychological harm is required in order to establish the constitutional-
ity of measures protecting minors from exposure to indecent speech....
Congress does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists
in order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable minds ....
Id. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634, 64143).
181. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43. For a discussion of the Court's required
link between legislation and interest, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
182. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 64243.
183. Id. (quoting C. Peter McGrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 7, 52 (1966)).
184. See id. (finding regulation valid because it satisfied Court's standard).
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. Accordingly, the validity of the ordinance as an appropriate
means to the government's end requires merely that it be impossi-
ble to say that it is irrational to make such a connection between
the regulated activity and the government's interest.18 5 In the case
of violent video games, it is not irrational to deduce that if such
games evoke aggressive tendencies and behavior, children who con-
tinually play them will not be able to contain that aggression every
time. 18 6 Therefore, as in Ginsberg, the ordinance is valid because it
is impossible to conclude that aggressive tendencies and behavior
are not rationally related to violence.' 87
Moreover, the Kendrick court's inference that the City was ex-
perimenting with regulating violence and would next proceed to
movies and possibly other forms of entertainment if the court vali-
dated the ordinance is implausible.1 88 Restrictions on movies al-
ready exist through the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA") rating system, which, like the Indianapolis ordinance,
only permits children's admittance to violent films if accompanied
by an adult.189 While the MPAA ratings are voluntary and not man-
dated by the government, there would be no need for the govern-
ment to regulate an industry that is already self-regulated without
one Supreme Court challenge. 190 Further, the MPAA's "R" rating
for violent content (requiring the accompaniment of an adult for
children under the age of seventeen) lends credence to the notion
that the general public accepts that such material is harmful to
children. 1'9
185. For a discussion of this standard, see supra notes 175-84 and accompany-
ing text.
186. See Condon, supra note 28, at 42 (suggesting increased aggression from
video games can push children over edge and cause them to act violently); Holle-
man, supra note 18, at EV3 (citing social psychologist Karen E. Dill's testimony
before Congress that sometimes children's increased aggressive tendencies cause
them to act violently).
187. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43. For a discussion of this standard, see
supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion on how movies are regulated, see infra notes 189-91 and
accompanying text.
189. See Borger by Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(explaining MPAA rating board looks to "theme, violence, language, nudity, sensu-
ality, drug abuse, and other elements" to determine what rating to give film).
190. See Hamilton, supra note 91, at 205-06 ("[T]he MPAA is a voluntary in-
dustry organization ... [whose rating system] has thus far been accepted by the
courts .... ).
191. See Emily R. Caron, Comment, Blood, Guts & the First Amendment: Regulat-
ing Violence in the Entertainment Media, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 89, 93 (2001) (ex-
pounding MPAA established its rating system in 1930 in response to pressure from
Roman Catholic Church to "clean up" content of popular movies believed to be
20031
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The court's fourth assertion that cartoon characters are not a
threat because they are not real does not reflect actuality. 192 After
watching an episode of the animated television show Beavis and
Butthead, which depicts teenaged boys who are obsessed with fire, a
young boy emulated the characters' actions by igniting his trailer
home, consequently killing his sister.' 93 In addition, after the Col-
umbine High School massacre in 1999, a home movie created by
the two teenaged boys responsible for the bloodbath surfaced. 194
In it, one of the boys who avidly played the video game Doom de-
clared his desire to use a sawed-off shotgun "straight out of Doom" at
school. 195 The issue regarding copycat incidents of violence is not
that the cartoon characters of Beavis and Butthead and Doom are be-
lievable, but that children are simply more impressionable than
adults. 196 The Supreme Court has conceded such vulnerability by
establishing a lower level of First Amendment protection for chil-
dren. 19 7 Children are more prone to act on feelings evoked by
inappropriate for children's viewing, and subsequently, most theaters would not
exhibit movies without MPAA seal).
192. For a discussion of how even cartoon characters can provoke copycat
behavior in children, see infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
193. See David V. Scott, Comment, The V-Chip Debate: Blocking Television Sex,
Violence, and the First Amendment, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 741, 742 (1996) (demon-
strating children's exposure to television violence leads to copycat incidents of vio-
lence); see alsoJohn Windhausen, Congressional Interest in the Problem of Television and
Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 783, 788 (1994) (noting evidence of need for Con-
gress to regulate violence in media).
194. See CBS News: 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 17, 2001) (in-
vestigating shootings at Columbine by interviewing classmates of teenaged killers
and others at scene), available at 2001 WL 7139609.
195. See id. (interviewing friend of teenaged killers who informed CBS re-
porter, " [i] n the video games that we played, the sawed off shotgun [from Doom]
was their favorite weapon"); see also Hamilton, supra note 91, at 186 (noting violent
video games have both parents and psychiatrists concerned). Psychiatrists label
Doom as one of the most violent and dangerous role-playing games available to
children because it "embodies a dangerous concept[:] in order to win, the player
must kill all of the other characters in the game." Id.; see also Condon, supra note
28, at 42 ("While countless other factors are at work when teen-agers resort to
violent outbursts, can we seriously suggest that the video game Doom played no role
in the Columbine High School massacre in Littleton, Colo[rado]? Of course
not.").
196. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (inferring persistent exposure to dangerous material inevitably coarsens im-
pressionable minds of children); see also Condon, supra note 28, at 40 ("The FTC
itself has called upon Hollywood to voluntarily stop targeting impressionable teen-
agers with violence-laced products.").
197. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 n.6 (1968) ("The world of
children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of
immaturity ... impose[s] different rules.").
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images to mimic what they see. s98 Because studies prove that vio-
lent imagery arouses certain feelings that provoke violence, regard-
less of whether the images are animated, there is danger to the
child and the community. 199
Although courts have held that video games do not invoke First
Amendment protection, even if they did, the Indianapolis ordi-
nance would pass constitutional muster.200 This is because it with-
stands the O'Brien test.20 1 First, substantial interests under the state
police power propelled the ordinance.20 2 The purpose of the ordi-
nance was to "[protect] the well-being of minors, [protect] parents'
authority to shield their minor children from influences that [are]
inappropriate or offensive, and [reduce] juvenile crime." 20 3 The
Supreme Court has recognized that assisting parents in shielding
their children from harm is within the constitutional police power
of government because it is an important state interest.20 4 In addi-
tion, combating a potential source of juvenile violence protects the
psychological well-being of the child and the overall safety of the
198. See Condon, supra note 28, at 40 (noting reasonable conclusion that ex-
posure to media violence causes violence in children due to so many recent trage-
dies with children mimicking specific depictions of violence in movies, television,
and radio).
199. See id. (asserting need to stop entertainment industry from targeting chil-
dren with violence in media); Golab, supra note 25, at 8 ("[V]ideo games can de-
sensitize children to violence .... [and] games like Quake and Doom don't teach
kids how to deal with other people or how to solve problems. [They] just show[ ]
them that even the good guys use violence as a means to an end."); see also Hamil-
ton, supra note 91, at 186 (stating Australian government has brought video games
under control of Australian national censorship system in noting that concern for
harmful effects of violent video games on children is worldwide); Nechas & Foley,
supra note 25, at 6 ("[V]iolent games aren't doing anyone any good."). Research-
ers believe that these games may influence children's behavior by teaching them
aggressive solutions to their problems. See id.
200. For a discussion of how the Indianapolis ordinance withstands the
O'Brien test, see infra notes 202-223 and accompanying text.
201. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). For a discussion
of the O'Brien requirements, see supra notes 62-88 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the state's police power, see supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
203. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (S.D.
Ind. 2000) (quoting City's interest in preamble to ordinance), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572
(7th Cir. 2001).
204. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[C]onstitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society."); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (asserting government has compelling interest in promoting parental
supervision of that to which children are exposed).
29
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entire community. 205 Therefore, both are valid exercises of the
state's police power and substantial interests of government.20 6
To satisfy the second prong of the O'Brien test, the government
must show that the regulated activity frustrates a substantial inter-
est, and ultimately demonstrate that its regulation furthers the sub-
stantial interest.2°17 The City in Kendrick presented studies showing
that violent video games cause children to behave aggressively.2 08 It
is reasonable to conclude that aggressive behavior has the potential
to result in violence, especially in children because they are not as
capable as adults of channeling their aggression.209 It is also rea-
sonable to conclude that violent video games at public arcades frus-
trate the government's interests in assisting parents to shield their
children from harm and in counteracting juvenile crime.210 The
City did not have to show that violent video games cause a direct
rise in violent crime. 211 It only had to show that given the situation,
the ordinance would accomplish the City's legitimate goal.2 12 For
instance, in O'Brien, the Court did not rely on scientific evidence to
show that the ordinance satisfied the government's substantial in-
terest.2 13 The Court logically concluded that prohibiting draft card
205. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("We recognize the
importance of the exercise of a state's police power to minimize all incentives to
crime, particularly in the field of ... juvenile delinquency."); Eclipse Enters., Inc.
v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) ("There is no dispute that the [govern-
ment] has a compelling interest in protecting the psychological well-being of mi-
nors and in combating juvenile crime."); Action, 58 F.3d at 663 ("[S]ociety has an
interest not only in the health of its youth, but also in its quality.").
206. For a discussion of what qualifies as within the state's police power, see
supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
207. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). For a discussion
of the substantial interest requirement, see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying
text.
208. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir.
2001). For a discussion of the studies presented in Kendrick, see supra notes 127,
143-46 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the impressionable minds of children and how their
aggressive tendencies often evoke violent behavior, see supra notes 186, 193-99 and
accompanying text.
210. See Hamilton, supra note 91, at 182 (indicating parents' fear that their
children are harmed by playing violent video games while out of their control and
supervision, and asserting danger of juvenile crime).
211. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)
(suggesting no studies are necessary "so long as whatever evidence the city relies
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses").
212. For a discussion of what the O'Brien test requires to show that a regula-
tion accomplishes the government's legitimate goal, see supra notes 68-75 and ac-
companying text.
213. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 378-80 (1968) (requiring
much less than scientific certainty to show regulation furthered substantial
interest).
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burning combats the concern for obstructions to army conscrip-
tion.214 Because conditioning children's access to violent video
games on parental supervision furthers both substantial interests of
assisting parents in shielding their children from harm and of
preventing the potential for juvenile crime, the ordinance passed
this second constraint.215
Third, the governmental interest was content-neutral. 216 That
is, it was unrelated to the suppression of free speech because the
regulation was intended to prevent violence and assist parents with
shielding their children, and not to suppress a particular message,
opinion, or idea.2 17  Therefore, the ordinance regulated the
noncommunicative impact of the video games, not the video games
themselves. 218
Finally, consistent with the fourth O'Brien prong, the restriction
was no greater than essential to further the governmental inter-
est.2 19 The ordinance did not ban minors from playing certain
video games; it simply conditioned their use by requiring the super-
214. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298-99 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) ("The Court [in O'Brien] did not require evidence ... docu-
menting instances of draft card mutilation or the actual effect of such mutilation
on the Government's asserted efficiency interests. But the Court permitted Con-
gress to take official notice, as it were, that draft card destruction would jeopardize
the [Selective Service] system.").
215. See Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS
Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 123, 129-30 (2000) ("[L]ack of effective parental super-
vision has a strong relationship to delinquency."). The author explained:
The ability of adults to monitor and supervise, impose sanctions, shame,
and otherwise keep young people in line through face-to-face interaction
within important social institutions is an important variable in delin-
quency prevention. There is a considerable amount of criminological evi-
dence that suggests that these informal mechanisms of social control,
operating within families, schools, neighborhoods, workplaces, and social
networks, play an important role in preventing youth crime and violence.
Id.
216. For a discussion of the requirement of content-neutrality, see supra notes
78-82 and accompanying text.
217. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573-74 (7th
Cir. 2001) (noting legislative history of ordinance indicates that its purpose was to
prevent violent video games from engendering child players to commit violent
acts). The court explained the purpose of the ordinance by stating that "the City is
... concerned with the welfare of the game-playing children ... and... of their
potential victims." Id. at 576.
218. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-78. For a discussion of the noncommunica-
tive impact of speech, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
219. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82. For a discussion of the least restrictive
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vision of a parent or other custodian.220 It left open alternative
means of the manufacturers' expression because they could still dis-
play their violent games to children accompanied by an adult, and
to adults at all times.221 Further, children could play any other type
of video game without the accompaniment of a parent or custo-
dian, as long as its violence did not rise to the qualification of de-
picting "realistic serious injury to a human or human-like being
where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation, dis-
memberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration." 222
Because the City appropriately limited its scope to children and to
the least restrictive means necessary, the ordinance was narrowly
tailored to serve the City's substantial interests.2 23
V. IMPACT
Violent video games have become a prevalent form of en-
tertainment in children's lives. 22 4 In light of their documented
harmful effects on children, it is crucial for the Supreme Court to
qualify them as unprotected by the First Amendment. 225 The Su-
preme Court has created exception for obscenity as a result of con-
cern for protecting children from exposure to immoral sexual
imagery, which has the potential to cause harm.22 6 Justice Stevens,
commenting on sexually explicit material, explained:
[S]ociety's interest in protecting this type of expression is
of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate that inspired
Voltaire's immortal comment... .. [F]ew of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
220. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573 (explaining parameters of ordinance and
providing that it only applied to children unaccompanied by parent, guardian, or
other custodian).
221. For a description of the ordinance, see supra notes 122-23 and accompa-
nying text.
222. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (S.D.
Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). For a description of the ordinance,
see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
223. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). For an expla-
nation of the "narrowly tailored" requirement, see supra notes 83-88 and accompa-
nying text.
224. See Hamilton, supra note 91, at 185 (estimating that Doom had reached
over one million people worldwide in 1995).
225. For a discussion of the harm violent video games cause to children, see
supra notes 18-28, 194-99 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of obscenity, see supra notes 51-59 and accompanying
[Vol. 10: p. 69
32
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss1/5
REGULATING VIOLENT ARCADE GAMES
citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited
in the theaters of our choice. 227
The same can be said of violence because violence is at least as
harmful to children's development and society's general well-being
as graphic depictions of sex.228 The International Committee of
the Red Cross stated in its report on the impact of violent video
games, "[t]o deny the link between visual violent media and vio-
lence in our society is truly like denying that tobacco causes can-
cer."229 Then why is it so difficult for the Court to treat violence
like obscenity? The answer is unfathomable, especially when chil-
dren's minds are so malleable that they emulate what they see. 230
The concern for preventing violence is especially critical today
when murder and mayhem are rampant, and depictions of violence
are readily accessible to the impressionable minds of children. 231
Regulation of a documented source of such violent tendencies
should reflect this concern.
Moreover, the Court has sanctioned governmental regulations
of television and film to protect children.232 In comparison to
those modes of communication, video games are pure entertainment,
substantially deficient in communicative value, and thus not
227. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) (upholding zoning restriction requiring at least 1000 feet in be-
tween adult movie theaters and other adult establishments).
228. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 981
(S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). For a synopsis of the court's
reasoning, see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
229. Juliet Dee, Basketball Diaries, Natural Born Killers and School Shootings:
Should There Be Limits on Speech Which Triggers Copycat Violence?, 77 DENV. U. L. REv.
713, 734 (2000) (quoting Robin Coupland, Humans and Weapons, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Internal Doc. (Feb. 10, 2000)).
230. For a discussion of copycat incidents of violence due to children's im-
pressionability, see supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
231. See Curt Anderson, FBI: Crime Up First Time in Decade, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 102132284. The FBI reported that in 2001,
violent crimes rose in the United States for the first time in a decade. See id. Such
crimes included murder, armed robbery, rape, and burglary. See id. The FBI re-
port did not include the September 11 th deaths at the World Trade Center, Penta-
gon, and Pennsylvania site because they were "different from the day-to-day crimes
committed in this country." Id.; see also Hamilton, supra note 91, at 182 ("Parents
are concerned that their children, playing ... violent video games, may carry that
violence into the real world where people do not often get up again after being
shot, stabbed, or dismembered.").
232. For a discussion of First Amendment application to various modes of
speech and exceptions for children, see supra notes 40-88 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the MPAA system of regulating children's admission to violent
movies, see supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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speech. 23  Video games are also more dangerous than television or
film because they engage the player in violent action by requiring
the child to pull the trigger, jab the sword, or throw the punch. 234
If there is a concern about children purely witnessing harmful be-
havior on a television or movie screen, then there should be an
even greater concern for children actively controlling it.235
A district court judge has asserted aptly:
It would be an odd conception of the First Amendment
... that would allow a state to prevent a boy from purchas-
ing a magazine containing pictures of topless women in
provocative poses .... but give that same boy a constitu-
tional right to train to become a sniper at the local arcade
without his parent's permission. 236
This remark rings true especially today when there is a multitude of
psychological research revealing a link between violent video games
and harm to children's moral and social development, including
the manifestation of violent tendencies. 237 Therefore, it is time for
the Supreme Court to address whether children's access to violent
arcade games can be regulated constitutionally.2 38 In doing so, it
should find in the affirmative, concluding that the decision of Ken-
drick was improper and ultimately dismissive of a legitimate, grow-
ing concern in today's society. If it fails to reach this result,
children will continue to intuit that violence is entertaining, re-
warding, and accepted by adults, the consequences of which negate
crucial efforts to protect children, minimize crime, and rid society
of impending doom.2 39
Elizabeth A. Previte
233. For a discussion of how violent video games lack informational, educa-
tional, and artistic content, see supra notes 92-95, 161-63 and accompanying text.
234. For a discussion of how violent video games are more dangerous to chil-
dren than other entertainment forms due to the required level of interaction, see
supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
235. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 981
(S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). For a synopsis of the court's
reasoning, see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
236. Am. Amusement, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (validating ordinance restricting
children's access to violent video games).
237. For a discussion of psychologists' theories of harm to children from vio-
lent video games, see supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
238. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue,
see supra notes 89-91, 96 and accompanying text.
239. For a discussion of the harm violent video games cause to children, see
supra notes 18-28, 193-99 and accompanying text.
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